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Abstract
In multimedia crowdsourcing, the requester’s quality requirements and reward decisions will affect
the workers’ task selection strategies and the quality of their multimedia contributions. In this paper, we
present a first study on how the workers’ bounded cognitive rationality interacts with and affects the
decisions and performance of a multimedia crowdsourcing system. Specifically, we consider a two-stage
model, where a requester first determines the reward and the quality requirement for each task, and the
workers select the tasks to accomplish accordingly. First, we consider the benchmark case where users
are fully rational, and derive the requester’s optimal rewards and quality requirements for the tasks. Next,
we focus on the more practical bounded rational case by modeling the workers’ task selection behaviors
using the cognitive hierarchy theory. Comparing with the fully rational benchmark, we show that the
requester can increase her profit by taking advantage of the workers’ bounded cognitive rationality,
especially when the workers’ population is large or the workers’ average cognitive level is low. When
the workers’ average cognitive level is very high, however, the equilibrium under the practical bounded
rational model converges to that under the benchmark fully rational model. It is because workers at
different levels make decisions sequentially and high cognitive level workers can accurately predict
other users’ strategies. Under both the fully and bounded rational models, we show that if workers are
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Part of this paper was presented in GLOBECOM’18 [1]. The major differences between the journal and conference versions
are: a) Multimedia crowdsourcing background: In [1], we considered a general crowdsourcing platform and studied only the
rewards for the tasks. In this journal submission, we further consider the quality requirement together with the reward for each
task, which is important for multimedia applications. b) A more general system model: We extend our crowdsourcing model from
two tasks to multiple tasks, which involves solving a challenging mixed integer non-linear programming problem. c) Performance
evaluation: In this journal submission, we have some new simulation results. We demonstrate the impacts of additional parameters
that were not considered in [1]. To summarize, the overall difference between the journal and conference versions exceeds 60%.
2heterogeneous but one type of workers (either the high or the low quality) dominates the platform, the
requester cannot make a higher profit by setting different quality requirements for different tasks.
Index Terms: Multimedia crowdsourcing, bounded rationality, cognitive hierarchy theory, game theory.
1I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivations
Mobile Crowdsourcing [2] is a fast-growing outsourcing paradigm that exploits the sensing
capabilities of mobile devices from a large group of workers. With the advanced functionalities
and sensors (e.g., high-resolution cameras, microphones, and GPS) of mobile devices, we can
reveal the full potential of crowdsourcing, which may revolutionize many areas in our daily
life, such as health care, transportation, and multimedia consumption. Multimedia crowdsourcing
[3], which is a special kind of mobile crowdsourcing for images, audios, and videos, possesses
great benefits in areas such as online education, social networking, and environment monitoring.
For instance, multimedia crowdsourcing for traffic monitoring can reveal more details than non-
multimedia measurements. When a traffic accident occurs, the real-time pictures and videos can
help rescuers better estimate the number of people trapped in a particular area more accurately
in advance.
Today’s multimedia crowdsourcing platforms (e.g., Foap [4]) make it possible to hire workers
worldwide to accomplish a common task. In such a system, a requester is usually responsible
for publishing tasks together with the corresponding rewards and quality requirements, so that
the workers can claim and complete the tasks to earn these rewards. For instance, some travel
platforms (e.g., Ctrip [5] and KLOOK [6]) would like to hire some individuals to collect photos or
write traveling notes at some scenic spots, aiming at enriching their photo bases and enhancing
their reputation. Those photographers who produce photos with good resolution and location
choices will be rewarded with some coupons or even cash [7]. To achieve her desirable outcome,
a requester needs to properly design an incentive mechanism on how much reward to give, how
to set the quality requirement, and how to share the reward.
The trend of multimedia crowdsourcing attracts more mobile workers to produce and distribute
multimedia information and contents. However, due to the dynamic and distributed characteristics
of the multimedia sources (e.g., audios, videos, and graphics), multimedia crowdsourcing imposes
more stringent quality requirements than usual mobile crowdsensing applications, hence poses
new challenges for the incentive mechanism design. For example, Ctrip prefers photos and travel
notes with high quality (i.e., carefully designed photos and elaborated written notes) and aims to
2recruit professional photographers to upload high quality pictures. To achieve this, Ctrip publishes
some photo-taking tasks with high rewards and high quality requirements to attract the high
quality workers to complete these particular tasks [8]. If the requester sets the requirement too
high, however, there will be fewer eligible workers, who can complete these tasks, and it might
negatively affect the eventual goal of the requester. Thereby, crowdsourcing based multimedia
applications involve a complex tradeoff among the rewards, quality requirements, and the workers’
participation. However, most existing studies (e.g., [9]–[12]) only focus on the reward design
without considering the quality requirements.
Furthermore, regarding the workers’ participation, existing literature on incentive mechanism
designs in crowdsourcing (including multimedia crowdsourcing) usually consider the fully rational
workers (e.g., [13]–[16]), who have the same infinite cognitive levels of reasoning other workers’
decisions when choosing their own. As a result, the workers’ interactions in terms of the task
selections are formulated as a non-cooperative game, with the Nash equilibrium (NE) being the
most widely used solution concept [17]. However, extensive experimental studies in psychology
have shown that people often have cognitive limits when making their reasoning decisions (e.g.,
[18]–[20]). Hence it is more accurate to consider the bounded rational workers, who have
heterogeneous and finite cognitive levels of reasoning about the others’ decisions. The cognitive
heterogeneity of the workers exerts a great impact on their data collecting decisions, and eventually
influences the requester’s multimedia information and quality. This motivates us to consider the
workers cognitive capabilities in the modeling of multimedia crowdsourcing systems.
One widely adopted theory that mathematically characterizes the players’ limited cognitive
capacities is the cognitive hierarchy (CH) theory [18] (which is part of the behavioral game
theory). Under the CH theory, the players, who are categorized into different cognitive levels,
reason in a progressive manner to achieve the cognitive hierarchy equilibrium. More specifically,
the level-0 (lowest cognitive level) players select their strategies randomly without predicting
the choices of the other players. A level-1 player, who is one cognitive level higher than the
level-0 player, makes his choice by predicting other users’ choices by assuming that all the
other players are level-0 players. In general, a level-k player assumes that the other players are
distributed according to a normalized Poisson distribution [18] from level-0 to level-(k−1) in the
population, and makes his decision by anticipating the other players’ decisions accordingly. This
3means that a level-k player can accurately estimate the relative proportions of all the lower level
players, but ignores the fact that there can be other players at the same or higher levels than his.
We will give the more detailed mathematical characterization of the CH theory in Section V. By
analyzing the workers’ behaviors from level-0 to level-∞ progressively, we can compute the total
number of workers selecting each task. The CH theory has been very successful at explaining
deviations from the NE for a wide range of applications, such as marketing [20], business [21],
and network science [22].
In this paper, we aim to answer the following key questions:
• How would the bounded rational workers select the multimedia sensing tasks?
• How would the cognitive heterogeneity of the workers influence the requester’s profit-
maximizing task parameter choices (i.e., reward and quality requirement)?
• What is the relationship between the bounded rational model and the fully rational benchmark
used in the literature?
B. Contributions
As the first paper on modeling the workers’ limited cognitive reasoning capability in multimedia
crowdsourcing, we consider a simple model where a single requester recruits some workers to
complete multiple tasks. Different tasks involve different completion costs, and generate different
revenues for a requester, if completed with different qualities. We derive the requester’s optimal
rewards and quality requirements, as well as workers’ task selection equilibrium in both the
benchmark fully rational (FR) model and the bounded rational (BR) model.
We summarize the key results and contributions of this paper as follows:
• Novel crowdsourcing model with the CH theory: To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first paper that applies the CH theory in multimedia crowdsourcing systems, which integrates
the quality requirements of tasks and the cognitive heterogeneity of workers.
• Optimal and near-optimal solutions to the FR benchmark: Under the FR model, we can com-
pute the requester’s optimal task reward and quality settings and the workers’ corresponding
NE when the workers have homogeneous quality capabilities. For the case of heterogeneous
worker quality capabilities, we propose a low-complexity heuristic algorithm to compute the
near-optimal solutions of a mixed integer programming problem.
4• Theoretical and numerical analysis in the BR model: Under the BR model, we show that
the task selection equilibrium converges to the FR benchmark in the limiting case when
the workers’ average cognitive level is high enough. Such an equivalence is not generally
true in other systems, and we prove the result by exploiting the special structure of our
problem. Under the more realistic case of a finite level of average cognitive level, however,
the requester can increase her profit (compared with the FR case) by reducing the reward
and taking advantage of the workers with low reasoning capabilities, especially when the
workers’ population is large or the workers’ average cognitive level is low.
• Exploiting workers’ heterogeneity in quality: With heterogeneous workers, in general, the
requester can increase her profit by choosing different quality requirements for different tasks
(comparing with the single quality requirement for all tasks) under both the FR and BR
models. When a single (i.e., high or low) quality capability workers dominate the platform,
however, the benefit of quality requirement differentiation disappears, because the rest of
the workers (with a different quality capability than the majority workers) are not enough
to make a difference.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first review the related literature in Section II
and describe our two-stage system model in Section III. Then in Section IV, we derive requester’s
near-optimal task settings and workers’ task selections in the FR case. Next, we introduce the BR
model and compare it with the FR model in Section V. Finally, we demonstrate the performance
of these two models through numerical examples in Section VI, and conclude the paper in Section
VII.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Although there have been many studies on the incentive mechanism design of crowdsourcing
systems, a lot of them (e.g., [9]–[14]) do not consider quality requirements, so they are not
applicable to the multimedia crowdsourcing applications.
Several studies consider the incentive mechanism design in the context of multimedia crowd-
sourcing by jointly considering the quality requirements and rewards (e.g., [3], [15], [16], [23]).
For example, Maharjan et al. [3] propose a cloud-enabled multimedia crowdsourcing framework,
where workers’ optimal service durations depend on the rewards and quality capabilities. Yang
5et al. [15] jointly consider quality estimation and monetary incentive, and propose a quality-
based truth estimation for crowdsensing. Song et al. [16] and Jin et al. [23] develope incentive
mechanisms considering workers’ quality of information. However, the crowdsourcing workers
in these papers are all assumed to be fully rational.
Several recent works in crowdsourcing start to challenge this widely used assumption of full
rationality (e.g., [24]–[26]). For example, Karaliopoulos et al. [24] question the fully rational
assumption in crowdsourcing systems with the support of empirical data, but they only conduct
a comparative study of different behavioral theories. Natalicchio et al. [25] declare that higher
reasoning level workers would contribute to a higher quality solution, focusing only on a sim-
ulation study. Peng et al. [26] incorporate the bounded rationality of the contributors into an
evolutionary competing game formulation. The authors only consider the homogeneous workers
and mainly focus on iterative games and the evolutionary equilibrium solution, which requires a
long period for the contributors to learn and adapt. All these papers, however, do not take the
quality of data into account, which is crucial for the multimedia crowdsourcing applications.
Camerer et al. [18] propose the CH theory to explain players’ behavioral deviation from the
traditional equilibrium that has been widely adopted in the area of economics and management.
Abuzainab et al. [27] apply the CH theory in resource allocation problems, which is the first
studying incorporating the CH theory in the field of networking. Inspired by this idea, we introduce
the CH theory into our multimedia crowdsourcing framework.
As the existing literature on multimedia crowdsourcing (e.g., [3], [15], [16], [23]) do not
consider the impact of the workers’ bounded rationality, this work is the first study that applies
the CH theory to address this open research issue. We characterize how the workers’ average
cognitive level and heterogeneous quality capabilities, together with the population size, influence
the requester’s and workers’ decisions in the crowdsourcing system.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In Section III-A, we provide a high-level discussion of the multimedia crowdsourcing system.
Then we introduce the decisions of the requester and the workers in two stages: the requester
determines the rewards and quality requirements in Stage I (Section III-B), and the workers decide
which task to select in Stage II (Section III-C).
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Fig. 1. A two-stage multimedia crowdsourcing model. In Stage I, the requester sets rewards R to incentivize the workers to put
effort in M tasks, together with quality requirements Q. In Stage II, a worker can select to complete one of the tasks or not
to participate. Eligible workers (i.e., with equal or higher quality capacities than the requirement) who select the same task will
equally share the corresponding reward for that task.
A. Multimedia Crowdsourcing Setting
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a system where a requester announces M tasks on the
crowdsourcing platform. The requester associates task m ∈ M = {1, · · · ,M} with a reward
Rm ≥ 0 and a quality requirement Qm ≥ 0.1 For example, the requester publishes some photo
collecting tasks at some scenic locations and announces the rewards together with the photo
quality requirements. LetN = {1, · · · , N} be the set of workers who are active on this multimedia
crowdsourcing platform. We refer to the requester as “she” and a worker as “he” in the rest of
the paper.2
As in most multimedia crowdsourcing systems, the requester has a larger market power and
makes the decisions before the workers do. Thus, the workers can only treat the requester’s
decisions as fixed when optimizing their own decisions. Hence we model the interactions in the
system as a two-stage game. First, the requester sets the rewards and quality requirements, in
order to attract enough workers to complete these tasks with the goal of profit maximization
(details in Section III-B). Next, each worker determines whether to participate and if yes which
task to select, in order to maximize his payoff (details in Section III-C). We assume that a worker
1The quality requirements can respond to the pixel requirement of photos and resolution requirements of videos.
2This is just for discussion convenience without any gender preference.
7can only complete one task.3
B. Stage I: Requester’s Profit Maximization Problem
In Stage I, we assume that the requester is fully rational4 and determines the rewards R =
(Rm, ∀m ∈M) and the quality requirements Q = (Qm, ∀m ∈M) for M tasks to maximize her
profit. In Stage II, given rewards R and quality requirements Q, the number of workers who are
both eligible (with equal or higher quality capabilities than the requirement) and decide to choose
task m ∈ M is Nm(R,Q), which will be derived under the FR and BR models in Section IV
and Section V, respectively.
Let Um(QmNm) be the requester’s revenue function of task m ∈ M, which increases with
both the quality threshold Qm and the number of workers Nm selecting task m. First, since the
quality requirement determines the minimum quality level of the submitted photos, the contents’
quality and hence the requester’s revenue increase with Qm. Second, when there are more workers
collecting data for this task, the requester can have better multimedia contents to select from and
hence achieve a higher revenue (e.g., when using these photos to attract future travelers). To
capture the diminishing marginal return of the additional quality and number of workers, we
assume that Um(QmNm) is an increasing concave function in (Qm, Nm).
In Stage I, the requester determines the rewards and quality requirements to maximize her
profit (i.e., revenue minus reward) over the M tasks by considering the following problem:
Problem 1: The Requester’s Profit Maximization Problem
maximize
∑
m∈M
(Um(QmNm(R,Q))− Rm)
subject to Rm ≥ 0, Qm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈M,
variables R,Q.
(1)
3For example, the photo collecting locations are separately far-apart, and a worker cannot visit multiple locations within the
time period of interests.
4With sufficient computational power, it is often reasonable to assume that the requester is fully rational and can choose an
optimal strategy [26].
8C. Stage II: Workers’ Task Selection Problem
In Stage II, for each worker in set N , he needs to decide whether and which task to select.
We define qn as worker n’s quality capability related to his skills and the functionalities of his
photographing devices (e.g., smartphones, cameras, and GoPros). The value of qn is independent
of the tasks that he selects. Then we define an eligible task set for worker n as En(Q) = {m ∈
M : qn ≥ Qm}.
Let sn ∈ {0} ∪M be worker n’s choice (strategy), where sn = 0 represents not selecting any
task, and sn = m represents selecting task m ∈ M. When a worker selects (and completes) a
task m ∈M, he will incur a cost of cm ≥ 0.5 We assume that the cost is task dependent but not
worker dependent.6
Let s−n = (s1, . . . , sn−1, sn+1, . . . , sN) be the task selection strategies of all the workers
excluding worker n. Let Nm = {n ∈ N : sn = m,m ∈ En(Q)} denote the set of workers
who are both eligible and decide to select task m ∈ M in Stage II, with a size of Nm = |Nm|.
And we have
∑
m∈MNm ≤ N .
When multiple workers select to complete the same task m, the requester will equally divide
the reward among all Nm workers.
7 Hence the payoff of a worker n is
πn(sn, s−n,R,Q) =

0, if sn = 0,
Rm
Nm
− cm, if sn = m and m ∈ En(Q),
−cm, if sn = m and m /∈ En(Q).
(2)
5The cost function can include the cost of completing this task, e.g., the cost of fulfilling the requirement and the cost of
taking and uploading photos. For example, we can consider a resource consumption model cm = cm,p + cm,b · z, where cm,p is
the “processing cost” of fulfilling the task requirement, cm,b is the “bandwidth cost” related to cellular/Wi-Fi price of uploading
the data, and z is the transmitted data size.
6It is practically important to consider the task dependent case. For example, completing simple and small tasks (e.g., taking
and uploading photos) incurs a similar amount of cost for different workers. Different types of tasks, however, can lead to very
different costs (e.g., taking photos at two different places). In the future, we will consider the more general case of task-dependent
and worker-dependent cost.
7We assume that the task is easy to complete and there is no significant difference in terms of the workers’ efforts [28], hence
eligible participating workers have the same possibility of winning the reward, then it is fair to equally split the reward [26].
Another equivalent implementation is to give the total reward Rm to an arbitrary worker in the set Nm with an equal probability
1
Nm
. The expected reward of each worker in the set Nm is
Rm
Nm
.
9To maximize his payoff, a worker in Stage II will anticipate other worker’s strategies, and makes
his decision accordingly. In the FR case, workers will have an infinite reasoning capability and
can accurately predict the others’ behaviors based on (2). We will formulate the user interactions
as a non-cooperative game and derive the NE solution in Section IV. In the BR case, however,
we consider the more realistic assumption that workers have different and limited cognitive levels
and may have wrong beliefs about the others’ strategies. We derive the corresponding cognitive
hierarchy equilibrium (CHE) in Section V.
IV. FULLY RATIONAL MODEL
In this section, we consider the case when the workers are fully rational. In Section IV-A, we
formulate the task selection game in Stage II. Based on this, we compute the sufficient and nec-
essary conditions of the NE for both homogeneous and heterogeneous workers. By incorporating
such conditions in Stage I, we reformulate the requester’s profit optimization problem in Section
IV-B. Then we present the requester’s optimal reward and quality requirement settings and the
corresponding NE for homogeneous workers, and propose a low-complexity heuristic algorithm
to compute the near-optimal solutions to a mixed integer non-linear programming problem for
heterogeneous workers in Section IV-C.
A. Workers’ Non-cooperative Task Selection in Stage II
1) Non-cooperative Task Selection Game: Workers make their task selection decisions through
participating a non-cooperative game, where one worker’s payoff depends on the choices of all
the other workers.
Game 1: (Workers’ Task Selection Game) The Stage II’s task selection game is a tuple Ω =
(N ,S,Π) defined by:
• Players: The set of workers N .
• Strategies: Each worker n ∈ N selects a strategy sn ∈ Sn , {0} ∪M. The strategy profile
of all workers is s = (sn, ∀n ∈ N ). The set of feasible strategy profile of all workers is
S = ×n∈NSn.
• Payoffs: Each worker n ∈ N maximizes his payoff as defined in (2). The vectorΠ(s,R,Q) =
(πn(s,R,Q), ∀n ∈ N ) contains the payoff functions of all workers.
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2) Nash Equilibrium: For worker n, given the rewards R, the quality requirements Q, and
other workers’ strategy profile s
−n, he aims to maximize his payoff in (2):
Problem 2: Worker n’s Best Response Strategy Choice Problem
maximize
sn∈Sn
πn(sn, s−n,R,Q). (3)
Under a given s−n, there can be Nˆm = |{k ∈ N\{n} : sk = m,m ∈ Ek(Q)}| eligible workers
selecting task m. After solving Problem 2, worker n’s best response is
s∗n(s−n,R,Q) =

m, if m = argmax
i∈En(Q)
{ Ri
Nˆi+1
− ci} and RmNˆm+1 − cm ≥ 0,
8
0, otherwise.
(4)
The fixed point of all the workers’ best response choices is the Nash equilibrium (NE), where
no worker can improve his payoff by deviating from his task choice unilaterally.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium): Under fixed rewards R and quality requirements Q, a strategy
profile sNE is an NE of game Ω if
πn(s
NE
n , s
NE
−n ,R,Q) ≥ πn(sn, sNE−n , R,Q), ∀ sn ∈ Sn, ∀n ∈ N . (5)
We can write the number of workers selecting a task m ∈ M at the NE sNE under rewards
R and quality requirement Qm as
NNEm (R,Q) = |{n ∈ N : sNEn = m,m ∈ En(Q)}|. (6)
3) Analysis: We will focus on the case when workers have heterogeneous quality capabilities,
which includes the case of homogeneous model as a special case.
In the heterogeneous model, some workers possess high quality capabilities and are eligible
for completing both high and low quality requirement tasks, while other workers who are less
capable can only choose to complete low quality requirement tasks. When workers do not have
any differences in terms of capabilities, they are homogeneous. The reason behind this difference
is due to workers’ different skills and the capabilities of their photographing devices.9
6If multiple tasks satisfy the condition, then worker n will randomly select a task which satisfies the constraint.
9Due to the tractability of the homogeneous model, we can derive the requester’s optimal reward and quality requirement. For
the heterogeneous model, however, we can only obtain a near-optimal solution, as the corresponding optimization problem is
NP-hard. Therefore, we differentiate these two cases and discuss them separately in Section IV-C.
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More specifically, we assume that the workers have two quality capabilities.10 Without loss of
generality, we assume that the NH workers in the high quality capability set NH = {1, · · · , NH}
have a quality qH , and the remaining N − NH workers in the low quality capability set NL =
{NH + 1, · · · , N} have a quality qL < qH .
If there exists a task m ∈ M such that Qm > qH , then none of the workers are eligible for
this task and Nm = 0. This means that the requester will never choose a Qm larger than qH .
For the high quality capability workers with qH , they are eligible to complete task m with 0 ≤
Qm ≤ qH , while low quality capability workers with qL can only select low quality requirement
task m with 0 ≤ Qm ≤ qL. Hence, we have the quality threshold qL and then we further define
the high quality task set MH = {m ∈ M : qL < Qm ≤ qH} only for high quality capability
workers, and the low quality task set ML = {m ∈M : 0 ≤ Qm ≤ qL} which both high and low
quality capability workers can select from.
Note that if we have NH = 0, then all the workers have the same low quality capability, and the
heterogeneous setting degenerates to the homogeneous case. In this case, no workers are eligible
for the high quality requirement tasks, and the requester will choose MH = ∅ accordingly.
Next we characterize the NE strategies of the Workers’ Task Selection Game, under the
requester’s fixed rewards and quality requirements.
Proposition 1: Given rewards R and quality requirements Q, the numbers11 of workers in NH
and NL selecting the tasks at the NE, NNEH =
(
NNEH,m, ∀m ∈M
)
and NNEL =
(
NNEL,m, ∀m ∈M
)
,
satisfy the following necessary and sufficient conditions:
10This is a reasonable simplification for the case where one group of workers carry professional photographic devices and the
others rely on smartphones.
11Usually there are a larger number of workers on the platforms (e.g., Ctrip has 150 million active users), and the decision of
a single worker does not have a significant influence on the entire platform (where workers are regarded as non-atomic players
[29]). Hence, we consider continuous variables N as an approximation of the game formulation in the rest of the paper. For
notation simplicity, we use NNE instead of NNE(R,Q).
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NNEH,m = max
{
0,
Rm
cm + λ1
−NNEL,m
}
, ∀m ∈ M, (7a)
λ1
(
NH −
∑
m∈M
NNEH,m
)
= 0, (7b)
NNEL,m = 0, ∀m ∈MH , (7c)
NNEL,m = max
{
0,
Rm
cm + λ2
−NNEH,m
}
, ∀m ∈ ML, (7d)
λ2
(
NL −
∑
m∈M
NNEL,m
)
= 0, (7e)
λ1, λ2 ≥ 0,
∑
m∈M
NNEH,m ≤ NH ,
∑
m∈M
NNEL,m ≤ NL. (7f)
For a high quality worker who selects taskm (i.e., when NNEH,m =
Rm
cm+λ1
−NNEL,m > 0), constraint
(7a) illustrates that he always receives a payoff of Rm
NNE
H,m
+NNE
L,m
− cm = λ1 ≥ 0. If such a high
quality worker changes to select another task i with Ri
ci+λ1
−NNEL,i ≤ 0, he will receive a payoff of
Ri
NNE
H,i
+NNE
L,i
−ci ≤ λ1. Hence, a high quality worker selecting task m has no incentive to change his
strategy. If not all the high quality workers participate (i.e.,
∑
m∈MN
NE
H,m < NH ), then we have
λ1 = 0 from constraint (7b), which shows that a high quality worker who does not participate
will never change to select a task because of the zero payoff of selecting a task. These constraints
together show the high quality workers’ NE tasks selections.
For a low quality worker, he is not eligible to select a task with a high quality requirement as
shown in constraint (7c). Constraint (7d) illustrates that a low quality worker selecting task m ∈
ML has no incentive to change his strategy because he always receives a payoff of RmNNE
H,m
+NNE
L,m
−
cm = λ2 ≥ 0. If not all the low quality workers participate (i.e.,
∑
m∈MN
NE
L,m < NL), then we
have λ2 = 0 from constraint (7e), which shows that a low quality worker who does not participate
will never change to select a task because of the zero payoff of selecting a task. These constraints
together show the low quality workers’ NE tasks selections. The detailed proof of Proposition 1
is given in Appendix A.
Note that the feasible region of variables λ1 and N
NE
H in conditions (7b) and (7f) is a union of
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two convex sets,12 which is non-convex in general. Due to the same reason, the feasible region
of variables λ2 and N
NE
L in conditions (7e) and (7f) is non-convex. Given rewards and quality
requirements, the feasible set of the corresponding NE is fixed but cannot be computed easily
[30]. Instead, we directly incorporate these relationships as constraints into the requester’s profit
maximizing problem and formulate a bilevel optimization problem in Section IV-B.
B. Bilevel Optimization
In this subsection, we incorporate the necessary and sufficient conditions (7a)-(7f) into Problem
1 in Stage I and form a bilevel optimization problem [30]. This enables the requester to compute
his optimal choices of rewards and quality requirements in Stage I in (1) by considering the
worker’s selections in Stage II.
Problem 3: Requester’s Bilevel Profit Maximization Problem
maximize
∑
m∈M
(Um(Qm(N
NE
H,m +N
NE
L,m))−Rm) (8a)
subject to Rm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈M, (8b)
qL < Qm ≤ qH , ∀m ∈MH , 0 ≤ Qm ≤ qL, ∀m ∈ML, (8c)
(7a)− (7f),
variables R,Q,NNEH ,N
NE
L , λ1, λ2,MH ,ML. (8d)
Due to the non-convex feasible region of the variables in (7a)-(7f), Problem 3 is non-convex
and is difficult to solve. Nevertheless, we can exploit the special structure of the crowdsourcing
problem and simplify the problem formulation.13 In the Proposition 2, we introduce an alternative
characterization of the constraints in Problem 3 to simply the problem.
12We have λ1 = 0,
∑
m∈MN
NE
H,m ≤ N or λ1 > 0,
∑
m∈MN
NE
H,m = N , which is a union of two convex sets.
13We can show that the feasible region is a union of two convex sets. We then compute the optimal solution that achieves the
maximum profit on the two convex sets separately. Then we compare these results and derive the optimal rewards and quality
requirements.
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Proposition 2: The rewards RNE∗ and the quality requirements QNE∗ in Stage I are optimal
for Problem 3 only if
QNE∗m = qH , ∀m ∈ MH, QNE∗m = qL, ∀m ∈ML, (9a)
RNE∗m = cmN
NE∗
m , ∀m ∈M, (9b)
NNE∗m ≥ 0, ∀m ∈M,
∑
m∈M
NNE∗m ≤ N,
∑
m∈MH
NNE∗m ≤ NH . (9c)
Since the requester knows the workers’ quality capabilities, condition (9a) indicates that it is
optimal for her to differentiate the tasks with quality requirements and directly set the requirement
QNE∗m equal to the workers’ quality capabilities. Hence the requester can take advantage of all the
workers and fully utilize their quality capabilities. Conditions (9b) and (9c) together determine the
optimal rewards, which are just enough to compensate all the task-selecting workers’ operation
costs. As a result, any worker who selects a task will achieve a zero payoff, regardless of his
quality capability and the task that he selects (including the choice of not to participate).14 The
proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix B.
Proposition 2 shows the necessary conditions of the requester’s optimal rewards and quality
requirements in Stage I. We note that if conditions (9a)-(9c) hold, then all the constraints in
Problem 3 are satisfied. Thus, we can substitute NH,m+NL,m = Nm and Rm = cmNm to denote
the rewards in (8a). We can replace the quality requirement value with Qm in (8a) with (9a).
Equivalently, we can define ym ∈ {0, 1} to represent the quality requirement of task m ∈ M.
When ym = 1, task m has a high quality requirement Qm = qH ; when ym = 0, task m has a low
quality requirement Qm = qL. This notation also allows us to represent the high quality task set
as MH = {m ∈M : ym = 1}.
Based on the above discussions, we reformulate Problem 3 as follows:
14This is under the assumption that the requester has the complete information about the workers’ quality levels and costs. In
reality, the requester can set a reward which covers the workers’ costs but provides an extremely small payoff to motivate the
workers. For example, the rewards are usually less than 0.1 dollars on the crowdsourcing platforms (e.g., Amazon Mechanical
Turk [31]).
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Problem 4: Requester’s Profit Maximization Problem
maximize
∑
m∈M
(Um(((qH − qL)ym + qL)Nm)− cmNm) (10a)
subject to Nm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈M,
∑
m∈M
Nm ≤ N, (10b)
ym = {0, 1}, ∀m ∈M,
∑
m∈M
ymNm ≤ NH , (10c)
variables N ,y. (10d)
Note that Problem 4 is a mixed integer non-linear programming (MINLP) problem, which
cannot be solved in polynomial time in general [32]. Thus, we propose a low-complexity heuristic
algorithm to solve the problem in Section IV-C.
C. Low-Complexity Heuristic Algorithm to Solve Problem 4
In this subsection, we aim to solve Problem 4 using the following idea. First, once the set
MH is fixed (i.e., ym is determined, ∀m ∈M), we notice that the problem reduces to a convex
problem as we will state in Problem 5 below. Hence, the maximum profit under a fixed MH
can be calculated effectively [33]. Second, we propose a low-complexity heuristic algorithm (i.e.,
Algorithm 1) to compute several candidates of the set MH and select the one achieving the
highest profit as the near-optimal task set MN−OPTH . (The simulation results in Section VI-A
show that Algorithm 1 can achieve a good performance, where the profit is close to that under
the optimal settings (achieved by an exhaustive search). Hence, we refer to our task setMN−OPTH
as the near-optimal solution.)
First, let us consider the following reduced problem under a fixed high quality task set MH :
Problem 5: Requester’s Profit Maximization Problem under a Fixed MH
maximize Π(MH ,N) ,
∑
m∈MH
(Um(qHNm)− cmNm) +
∑
m∈M\MH
(Um(qLNm)− cmNm) (11a)
subject to Nm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈M,
∑
m∈M
Nm ≤ N, and
∑
m∈MH
Nm ≤ NH , (11b)
variables N . (11c)
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Note that for the case of homogeneous workers, we have NH = 0 andMH = ∅. Hence we can
directly compute the optimal solutions to the convex problem 5 as NNE∗, and have the optimal
rewards RNE∗ and quality requirements QNE∗ from Proposition 2.
For the case of heterogeneous workers, we further define the optimal solutions to the convex
Problem 5 as Nˆ(MH). Then, the maximum profit under this fixed MH can be calculated by
applying Nˆ (MH) into the objective function (11a), which we define as Π(MH , Nˆ(MH)).
Next we will derive the optimal set MH in order to solve Problem 4. Note that there are
totally 2M feasible choices of MH , hence the complexity of finding MH through the exhaustive
search is high. Since the requester in crowdsourcing applications usually needs a fast algorithm in
the task assignment process (e.g., real-time tasks such as emergency response [34]), we propose
the heuristic Algorithm 1 with a polynomial time complexity O(M2) to achieve a suboptimal
performance. Here, we want to clarify that Algorithm 1 is not to solve Problem 5. Instead, we
apply Algorithm 1 and the solution of convex Problem 5 one after another to find a near-optimal
solution of Problem 4.
• Initialization: We initialize the maximum profit MaxPro to be zero (line 1).
• Iteration process: At each iteration, we determine the task setMH by adding different tasks
and compute the corresponding profit. If the task set has a higher profit than that of the
previous task sets, then we adopt the new task set MH as the near-optimal set MN−OPTH .
– Preliminary: At the beginning of each iteration, we form a new task set MH = ∅ and
compute the corresponding profit profit (line 3).
– Greedy randomized task set search: When adding a task j ∈ M\MH into the task
set MH (line 6), we can calculate the profit Pj (line 7). Then, based on the greedy
randomized adaptive search technique [35], we restrict the feasible task candidate set J ∗
to be the set that includes all new tasks with profit no smaller than P ∗ = Pl+α(Ph−Pl)
(line 8)15. We then randomly select a task j∗ ∈ J ∗ and add task j∗ into the task set
15Here α ∈ [0, 1] is the adaptive rate. Here α = 1 corresponds to a greedy algorithm which only adopts a new task which
generates the highest profit at each iteration, while α = 0 corresponds to a totally random selection process. Since a greedy
algorithm cannot escape from a local optimal solution, and a totally randomized process needs more iterations to find a good
performance solution [35], we adopt α = 0.5 in our simulations. More discussions regarding the impact of α and maxIter
values on the convergence and optimality is given in Section VI-A.
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Algorithm 1: Greedy Randomized Task Set Search Algorithm for Computing Near-Optimal
Set MN−OPTH
Input: Utility vector u; cost c; total number N ; high quality workers’ number NH ; task set
M; adaptive parameter α; number of iterations MaxIter.
1 Initialization: MaxPro = 0 ;
2 for Iter = 1; Iter ≤MaxIter; Iter = Iter + 1 do
3 Set MH = ∅; Solve for Nˆ(MH) in problem 5; Calculate profit = Π
(
MH , Nˆ(MH)
)
;
4 for i = 1; i ≤M; i = i+ 1 do
5 foreach j ∈M\MH do
6 Set M′H =MH
⋃{j} ; Solve for Nˆ(M′H) in problem 5 ;
7 Calculate Pj = Π
(
M′H , Nˆ(M′H)
)
;
8 Ph = max
j∈M\MH
Pj ; Pl = min
j∈M\MH
Pj ; P
∗ = Pl + α(Ph − Pl) ;
9 J ∗ = {j∗ ∈M\MH : Pj∗ ≥ P ∗} ; Randomly select a task j∗ ∈ J ∗ ;
10 if Pj∗ ≥ profit then
11 Set MH =MH
⋃{j∗} ; Solve for Nˆ(MH) in problem 5 ;
12 Calculate profit = Π
(
MH , Nˆ(MH)
)
;
13 else
14 break ;
15 if profit > MaxPro then
16 MaxPro = profit ; MN−OPTH =MH ;
Output: MN−OPTH .
MH (line 9).
– New task set update: If the new task setMH has a profit higher than that of the previous
task set (without task j∗) (line 10), then we update the task set (line 11) together with
the new profit value (line 12). Otherwise, we terminate this iteration process (line 14).
This is because the number of workers with high quality capabilities is limited, we will
not always obtain a higher profit by adding a new task into the high quality requirement
task set.
• Output: At each iteration, we compare and update the near-optimal task set MN−OPTH as
18
TABLE I
KEY NOTATIONS
Meaning
FR Model BR Model
(Section IV) (Section V)
Stage I
Optimal
Rewards RNE∗ RCHE∗
Quality requirements QNE∗ QCHE∗
Near-optimal
Rewards RN−OPT -
Quality requirements QN−OPT -
Task Selection Equilibrium in Stage II NNE(R,Q) NCHE(R,Q)
well as the maximum profit MaxPro (line 16). This process repeats for MaxIter times,16
when we have enough iterations to have the near-optimal set MN−OPTH .
Third, by applying Algorithm 1 together with the optimal solutions to Problem 5, the requester
can determine the near-optimal set MN−OPTH and the corresponding Nˆ(MN−OPTH ). We then
compute near-optimal rewards RN−OPT and quality requirements QN−OPT in Stage I based on
Proposition 2 as follows:
QN−OPTm = qH , ∀m ∈MN−OPTH , QN−OPTm = qL, ∀m ∈M\MN−OPTH ,
RN−OPTm = cmNˆm(MN−OPTH ), ∀m ∈M.
(12)
We list the key notations of the FR and BR models in Table I.
V. BOUNDED RATIONAL MODEL
Extensive experimental studies have shown that people have cognitive limits when making
their reasoning decisions (e.g., [18]–[20]). Instead of making the often unrealistic full rationality
assumption, in this section we consider the more practical BR model, where the workers have
different reasoning capabilities. We model both the homogeneous and heterogeneous workers’
behaviors based on the CH theory in Section V-A, and theoretically compare the workers’ NE and
CHE task selections given the same rewards and task requirements in Section V-B. Specifically,
16The larger the number of iterations MaxIter, the larger will be the computation time and the better the solution [35]. We
adopt MaxIter = 20M (where M is the total number of tasks) to achieve the best empirical tradeoff between the computation
time and the solution performance. The detailed simulation is given in Section VI-A.
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we prove that the FR model is a limiting case of the BR model when the average cognitive level
τ approaches ∞ (i.e., all the users have an infinite reasoning capacity).17
A. Workers’ Task Selections in Stage II: Cognitive Hierarchy
To maximize his payoff in (2), a worker in Stage II consider choosing a task from set M. If
Rm < cm for a task m ∈ M, a worker will never select that task as his payoff will be negative
(even if he is the only one selecting the task). Hence, for the rest of the paper, we will focus on
the non-trivial case of Rm ≥ cm for each task m ∈M.
Next, we model the BR case based on the CH theory [18], where workers with different
cognitive thinking levels make decisions differently based on different beliefs of the other workers’
choices. We introduce the basic ideas of the CH theory similar as in [18]:
1) The total worker population can be divided into an infinite number of levels, indexed by
k = 0, 1, · · · ,∞. The number of workers at each level k follows a Poisson distribution [18]
f(k) = τ
k
k!
e−τ with a rate τ . The value of τ represents the average cognitive level of the
population. For example, a larger τ may reflect a higher average worker education level.
2) A level-k (k ≥ 1) worker knows the accurate relative ratios among workers at lower
rationality levels, f(h) for all 0 ≤ h ≤ k−1, and can accurately predict their behaviors, but
ignores the existence of other level-k and higher level workers. More specifically, a level-k
worker’s belief about the fraction of level-h (0 ≤ h ≤ k − 1) is gk(h) = f(h)∑k−1
j=0 f(j)
, where
the subscript “k” denotes that such belief is unique to the level-k worker. Furthermore, a
level-k worker believes that he is the only one with the highest cognitive capability in the
population, i.e., he is the only level-k worker in the population, and there are no workers
higher than level-k.18 Hence for any h ≥ k, we have gk(h) = 0. A level-k worker believes
17Note that this convergence is not generally true in the CH theory [18]. For example, some of the games do not have any
NE. Some games have multiple NEs, but the CHE only converges to a particular NE [20].
18Suppose that there are 200 level-0, 400 level-1, and 300 level-2 workers in the platform. The numbers are chosen for an
easy illustration and does not correspond to a particular Poisson distribution. A level-1 worker believes that all other 899 workers
are level-0. A level-2 worker has the belief that g2(0) =
200
200+400
= 0.33 and g2(1) =
400
200+400
= 0.67, i.e., there are 299.7
level-0 workers, and 599.3 level-1 workers. Here for simplicity we assume that the number of workers can be non-integer. This
significantly simplifies the analysis and does not bring much error when the worker population is large enough.
20
that level-h workers account for gk(h) fraction of the population.
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3) Based on the discussions of 1) and 2), we can compute the choices of workers at different
levels progressively. GivenRm ≥ cm, a level-0 worker believes that he will get a non-negative
payoff no matter which task to select (as he ignores the choices of any other worker in the
population), hence he will select an eligible task randomly. A level-k worker will select a
task that leads to the maximum payoff (including the choice of not participating), considering
the task selections of all other workers (which are assumed to be at lower levels).
Given any arbitrary rewardsR and quality requirementsQ in Stage I, we propose a progressive
task selection algorithm20 (i.e., Algorithm 2) motivated by the idea from [18], and compute the
CHE (NCHE) in Stage II. Notice that the application setting in [18] is different from here: the
players only decide whether to participate or not in [18], while workers have more task selection
choices in our model.
• Preliminary: Given the quality requirements, we compute the task set MH and ML with
high and low quality requirements respectively (line 1).
• Initialization: We initialize workers’ cognitive level as k = 0, the total fractions of workers
that have been considered by level-k workers as TF = 0 (line 2). We initialize the number of
high and low quality workers selecting task m as nHm = 0 and n
L
m = 0 respectively (line 2).
We initialize the fraction of level-0 workers with high and low quality capabilities selecting
task m as eH(0, m) = 1|M| and e
L(0, m) = 1|ML| , respectively (line 2).
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• Iteration process: At iteration k, we compute the number of level-k workers selecting a task
m ∈M. Given the task selections of level-0 to level-k workers, a level-(k + 1) worker can
compute his expected payoff if he selects a task m ∈M.
19Recall that in the FR model, every worker can correctly anticipate all other workers’ decisions in Stage II. In the BR model,
however, workers at different levels have different beliefs regarding the workers’ population composition and only anticipate the
choices of workers at lower levels.
20Note that Algorithm 2 can be applied to both the homogeneous and heterogeneous quality capabilities case. For homogeneous
case, the input number of high quality workers should be NH = 0.
21Sometimes, workers in a particular level may find that working on a number of tasks can lead to the same non-negative
payoff. In this case, there will be the same fraction of workers in this level choosing each task. Hence, we focus on the fraction
and then the expected number of workers in this level selecting these tasks.
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Algorithm 2: Task Selection Algorithm based on CH
Input: Rewards R; quality requirements Q; costs c; average cognitive level τ ; total number
of workers N ; worker number of high quality workers NH ; task set M; tolerant
error ǫ.
1 Compute MH = {m ∈M : qL < Qm ≤ qH} and ML = {m ∈M : 0 ≤ Qm ≤ qL} ;
2 Set k = TF = nHm = n
L
m = 0 ; e
H(0, m) = 1|M| , ∀m ∈M ; eL(0, m) = 1|ML| , ∀m ∈ML;
3 repeat
4 f(k) = τ
k
k!
e−τ ; TF = TF + f(k) ; k = k + 1 ;
5 foreach m ∈M do
6 nHm = n
H
m + f(k) · eH(k,m) ·NH ; nLm = nLm + f(k) · eL(k,m) · (N −NH) ;
7 if m ∈MH then
8 E(k,m) = Rm
nHm
TF
− cm ;
9 else
10 E(k,m) = Rm
nHm+n
L
m
TF
− cm ;
11 M∗L =
{
m∗ ∈ argmax
m∈ML
E(k,m)
}
; M∗H =
{
m∗ ∈ argmax
m∈M
E(k,m)
}
;
12 foreach m ∈M and i ∈ {H,L} do
13 if m ∈M∗i and E(k,m) ≥ 0 then
14 ei(k,m) = 1|M∗i |
;
15 else
16 ei(k,m) = 0 ;
17 until TF > 1− ǫ;
Output: CHE Solution: NCHE = (nHm + n
L
m, ∀m ∈M).
– Expected payoffs: We compute level-k workers’ fraction f(k) (line 4) and the number
of workers selecting task m (line 6). Then each level-(k + 1) worker believes that the
number of workers selecting a task m ∈ MH is nHmTF , while the number of selecting a
task m ∈ML is nHm+nLmTF . Then he computes his expected payoff E(k,m) when task m
has a high (or low, respectively) requirement (line 8 or line 10, respectively).
– Selecting tasks: For workers in level-(k + 1) with low (or high, respectively) quality
capabilities, they will select the tasks with maximum payoff. In other words, if task m is
in the optimal task set and the payoff is non-negative, then there will be 1
|M∗
L
|
(or 1
|M∗
H
|
,
respectively) fraction of level-(k + 1) workers choosing task m (line 14); otherwise,
none of the level-(k + 1) workers will select task m (line 16).
• Output: This process repeats until TF > 1− ǫ, when we have considered the reasoning of
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almost22 all the workers. The total number of workers selecting a task m ∈M at the CHE
is NCHEm = n
H
m + n
L
m.
B. What is the Connection between the FR and BR Models?
In this section, we show that the theoretically elegant FR model widely used in the literature
is a limiting case of the more practical BR model (as τ approaches ∞) in the context of our
crowdsourcing system.23 This means that the insights derived by the vast incentive mechanism
design literature for crowdsourcing are still good approximations of the reality when the workers
have sufficiently high reasoning capabilities (although this is not always true in practice).
For a fair comparison regarding the workers choices between the FR and BR models, we will
set the same R and Q in Stage I for both the FR and BR models. Then we derive and compare
the number of workers selecting task m ∈M in Stage II, which we will denote as NNEm (R,Q)
and NCHEm (R,Q) in the FR and BR models, respectively.
1) Homogeneous Worker Quality Capabilities: When the workers have the same quality ca-
pability, all of them are eligible for all the tasks. Since a worker cannot select multiple tasks
simultaneously, we have
∑
m∈MN
NE
m (R,Q) ≤ N . We will theoretically discuss the case of∑
m∈MN
NE
m (R,Q) = N in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: Consider the case where the number of homogeneous workers selecting tasks at
the NE satisfies
∑
m∈MN
NE
m (R,Q) = N . If we choose the same R and Q in the BR case,
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then we have the following results: (a) every worker will participate by selecting one of the M
tasks in the BR case (i.e., sn 6= 0, ∀n ∈ N ); (b) as τ approaches ∞, the CHE NCHEm (R,Q)
converges to the NE NNEm (R,Q), ∀m ∈M.
Theorem 1 shows that if the rewards are high enough for all the workers to participate under
the FR case, then the same rewards will also motivate all the BR workers to participate. The
detailed proof is given in Appendix C.
22Although k cannot reach ∞ to recruit all the workers, a small ǫ value (e.g., 10−3) can guarantee that most (over 99.9%)
workers in the platform are taken into consideration. However, a small ǫ value also incurs more iterations and computational
time.
23Camerer et al. [18] showed that as τ →∞, the CHE converges to an NE, if the NE can be reached by finitely many iterated
deletions of weakly dominated strategies. However, our crowdsourcing model here does not belong to this category of games.
24We have generalized this result comparing with Theorem 2 in [1], where we restricted the rewards to be R = RNE∗.
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2) Heterogeneous Worker Quality Capabilities: When the workers have heterogeneous quality
capabilities, high quality workers can select all the tasks, while the low quality ones can only
select the tasks with low quality requirements. Now we discuss the workers’ behaviors in Theorem
2.
Theorem 2: Consider the case where the number of heterogeneous workers selecting tasks at
the NE satisfies
∑
m∈MN
NE
m (R,Q) = N . If we choose the same R and Q in the BR case, then
every high quality worker will participate by selecting one of the M tasks in the BR case (i.e.,
sn 6= 0, ∀n ∈ NH).
Theorem 2 shows that even if the rewards are high enough to motivate all the workers, only
high quality workers are guaranteed to participate in the BR case. The detailed proof is given in
Appendix D.
Although we are not able to theoretically prove the convergence of CHE NCHEm (R,Q) to the
NE NNEm (R,Q) under the heterogeneous workers case and the case of
∑
m∈MN
NE
m (R,Q) < N ,
we have numerically validated this property through extensive simulations under various system
parameters in Appendix E. To sum up, the above theoretical and empirical studies show that the
FR model is a limiting case of the BR model, when the average cognitive level τ approaches
infinity.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the numerical results to demonstrate the performance of our mul-
timedia crowdsourcing solution. We first simulate the performance of Algorithm 1 in Section
VI-A, and illustrate the requester’s optimal rewards and quality requirements in Section VI-B.
Then, we further numerically compare the FR and BR models in Section VI-C.
Unless specified otherwise, we will use the utility function Um(QmNm) = um ln(1 +QmNm)
in the numerical results.
A. Performance Evaluation of Algorithm 1
In this subsection, we present our simulation results of the low complexity Algorithm 1 to
solve Problem 4. We show that Algorithm 1 can achieve a good performance, where the profit
is close to that under optimal settings.
24
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Fig. 2. Maximum total profit with different α and M .
Here we randomly generate M = 5, 10, and 20 tasks (small dimension scenarios), calculate
the average profit under different α values, and compare with the optimal value (obtained by the
exhaustive search) to show the near-optimality of our results.
When running Algorithm 1, we restrict MaxIter = 100 for M = 5 and 10 cases, while
changing the value of MaxIter for the case of M = 20. This is because MaxIter = 100 is
not always enough to achieve convergence for M = 20 tasks. The value of α (the adaptive rate)
also plays an important role. The results are summarized in Figure 2, with detailed discussions
as follows.
• Small α: When α is less than 0.6, our proposed algorithm achieves the near-optimal perfor-
mance. In particular, when M is small (5 or 10), the solution computed by our proposed
heuristic algorithm almost coincide with the optimal solution. When M is large, our solution
is close-to-optimal when we allow enough number of iterations (e.g., MaxIter = 500).
• Large α: When α > 0.8, our algorithm has a poor performance. This is because at each
iteration, we restrict the feasible task candidate set to be the set that includes all new tasks
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with profit no smaller than P ∗ = Pl + α(Ph − Pl).25 A large α value restricts the task
candidate set, and the task choices cannot escape from a local optimal solution. Specifically,
α = 1 corresponds to a greedy algorithm which only adopts a new task which generates the
highest profit at each iteration.
Therefore, we choose α = 0.5 and MaxIter = 20M (where M is the total number of tasks) to
achieve the best empirical trade off between the computation time and the solution performance.
B. Optimal Rewards and Quality Requirements of the Requester
In this subsection, we focus on the requester’s optimal rewards and quality requirements in
Stage I.
Note that the requester’s optimization problem in (1) is the same for both the FR and BR cases.
Due to the progressive nature of Algorithm 2 in determining the task selection, it is difficult to
solve Problem 1 in closed-form in the BR case. Nevertheless, we can still numerically compute the
Stage I optimal rewards RCHE∗ and quality requirements QCHE∗. We denote the corresponding
Stage II CHE as NCHE∗ = NCHE(RCHE∗,QCHE∗) for simplicity.
To gain a deeper understanding of the result, we consider the case of M = 3 and choose the
utility coefficients u = (30, 12, 8) and costs c = (2, 1, 3) for the sensing tasks. Then we compute
(RCHE∗,QCHE∗) for workers with either homogeneous and heterogeneous quality capabilities
and compare with the optimal task settings (RNE∗,QNE∗) in the FR case.
1) Numerical Example on Homogeneous Worker Quality Capabilities: In this case, the optimal
quality requirement for any taskm is QCHE∗m = qL. So we focus on characterizing how the optimal
reward RCHE∗m changes in the total number of workers N and the average cognitive level τ .
In Fig. 3, we first plot the optimal task 1 reward RNE∗1 against N in the FR model as a
benchmark.26 As we can see, RNE∗1 first increases with N and then remains unchanged. With a
small worker population (i.e., N ≤ 30), the requester wants to attract more workers to complete
the task. As N further increases, however, the marginal revenue of attracting an additional worker
25Remind that the highest profit achieved by adding an additional task is denoted as Ph, and the lowest profit value is denoted
as Pl in Line 8 of Algorithm 1.
26The optimal rewards for tasks 2 and 3 also follow similar patterns. We do not show them due to page limit.
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becomes smaller and eventually cannot compensate the cost, and the requester will not increase
the reward to attract them as RNE∗1 = 28.
Then we plot the optimal reward RCHE∗1 against N under different τ values. As we can see,
the optimal rewards do not monotonically increase in N . Consider the red curve of τ = 2 as an
example, and we can see different behaviors in several different ranges of N:
• When N increases from 20 to 80, RCHE∗1 monotonically increases as well. In this case, the
requester wants to attract more workers to complete the task.
• When N reaches a threshold (i.e., N = 90), the requester is able to reduce the reward,
because she anticipates there are more low cognitive level workers who always participate
as long as Rm ≥ cm. Then she can afford to provide a smaller reward just for the purpose
of attracting the high level workers.
• As N becomes very large (e.g., N ≥ 200), the optimal reward remains unchanged and equal
to the cost c1. In this case, as there are many level-0 workers in the population, it is enough
for the requester just to attract and exploit these cheap labors to complete the task.
Comparing the three curves with different τ values, a higher τ value (i.e., a more cognitive
capable population) makes it more difficult for the requester to exploit the workers. For specifi-
cally, the threshold for the requester to reduce the reward to RCHE∗m = cm are N = 50, 90, and
200 for τ = 1, 1.5, and 2, respectively.
Observation 1: The requester can take advantage of low cognitive level workers by setting
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smaller optimal rewards than the FR case, especially under a low average cognitive level and a
large worker population.
2) Numerical Example on Heterogeneous Worker Quality Capabilities: When the workers
have heterogeneous quality capabilities, the impacts of N and τ are similar to the homogeneous
case. Hence, we will focus our study on how the number of high quality workers NH affects the
requester’s decisions. We fix N = 20, τ = 1.5, qH = 2, qL = 1, and plot the requester’s optimal
decisions with respect to NH in Fig. 4.
In Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b), we plot the optimal reward RCHE∗1 and the optimal quality require-
ments QCHE∗ against NH , respectively.
27 In Fig. 4(c), we plot the optimal quality requirements
QNE∗ against NH to compare the FR and BR models.
We will first consider the CHE case in Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b), depending on the value of NH :
• When NH is very small (i.e., 1 ≤ NH ≤ 3), Fig. 4(b) shows that it is optimal not to set
any tasks with a high quality. If the requester chooses a high quality requirement for a task,
then the number of eligible workers is small. Instead, if she sets the quality requirement to
be low, the number of eligible workers is much larger, which generates a higher profit than
the high requirement case.
• When NH = 4, the requester is able to take advantage of the high quality workers. However,
NH is still not large enough, and the effect of having high number of workers also dominates
the profit generation process. Fig. 4(a) shows that the requester chooses to set a high quality
requirement for task 3 with the lowest utility parameter (um), while keeping the quality
requirements of other two tasks low (so that they can attract enough workers). Fig. 4(a)
shows that the reward for task 1 drops at NH = 4, as there are fewer workers that the
request can incentivize.
• As NH becomes larger (e.g., NH = 5), the effect of high quality begins to dominate the
profit generation process. It is better for the requester to choose the high quality requirement
for tasks with high utility parameters. Fig. 4(b) shows that as NH increases, eventually the
requester sets the quality requirements to be high for all three tasks. Fig. 4(a) shows that the
27The analysis of RCHE∗2 and R
CHE∗
3 are similar. However, since the quality requirements for the three tasks change differently,
the optimal rewards curves of three tasks mess up together. Here we only choose RCHE∗1 to illustrate.
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reward for task 1 drops a few times in this process, corresponding to the instances where
the competitions among tasks increase and the number of workers potentially interested in
task 1 reduces.
When comparing Fig. 4(b) with Fig. 4(c), we note that the optimal task quality requirements
under the BR case are similar to that under the FR case. This indicates that the requester can
exploit workers’ heterogeneity by setting different task quality requirements, regardless of the
workers’ reasoning capabilities (e.g., 4 ≤ NH ≤ 12 in Fig. 4(b) and Fig. 4(c)).28 When a single
(i.e., high or low) quality capability workers dominate the platform (e.g., 13 ≤ NH ≤ 20 in
Fig. 4(b) and Fig. 4(c)), however, the benefit of quality requirement differentiation disappears,
because the number of the rest of the workers (with a different quality capability than the majority
workers) is too small to make a difference.
When NH is very small (e.g., 1 ≤ NH ≤ 3 in Fig. 4(c)), consider the case where the requester
chooses to set a high quality requirement for task 3. Under the FR model, all the high quality
capability workers will focus on this task, and the profit is higher than the case where the requester
set a low quality requirement for task 3. Under the BR model, however, level-0 (including the
high quality capability) workers always randomly select the tasks, hence setting a high quality
requirement for task 3 will not improve the requester’s profit.
Observation 2: Under both the FR and BR models, it is profitable for the requester to differ-
entiate the tasks with different quality requirements, unless a single type of workers dominates
the platform.
Now we focus on how the quality capabilities qH and qL impact the requester and workers.
We fix N = 40, NH = 20, τ = 1.5, and qH = 10, and change qL from 1 to 10 (i.e., qL ∈ [1, 10)).
We have the results as follows.
• Workers’ payoff: In the FR model, from Proposition 2, the reward just compensates every
participating worker’s cost, hence the payoff for every worker remains unchanged as zero.
In the BR model, the optimal reward still cannot compensate low cognitive level workers’
cost, where each worker will encounter a negative payoff.
28For example, Ctrip sets different photo-taking tasks for both professionals and amateurs.
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• Requester’s profit: For both the FR and BR models, as qL increases, the requester’s profit
will also increase. This is because these low quality capability workers are now increasing
their capabilities, hence the requester can make more revenue from these workers.
C. Profit Comparison of the FB and BR Models
Now we focus on the profit comparison between the FR and BR models. We will show that
the requester can take advantage of the BR model and obtain a higher level of profit.
We choose the values of um and cm same as that in Section VI-B with M = 3 tasks. In the FR
model, we compute the near-optimal rewards RN−OPT , quality requirements QN−OPT (based on
Algorithm 1), and the corresponding NE NN−OPTm = N
NE
m (R
N−OPT ,QN−OPT ) for each m, or
(NN−OPTm , ∀m ∈ M) for simplicity. In the BR model, we set τ = 5. In the following, we will
consider two different cases, depending on whether R and Q are the same in both models.
1) The requester sets the same rewards and quality requirements: In the first scenario, we
assume that the requester sets the same rewards RN−OPT and quality requirements QN−OPT in
Stage I (both for the FR and BR models), and plot the number of workers selecting tasks for both
models in Fig. 5. This allows us to achieve a fair comparison in terms of the workers’ behaviors
in Stage II.
When N is small (i.e., N ≤ 25), Fig. 5 shows that the number of workers Nm for each taskm is
similar under NE and CHE (e.g., the two black curves ofNN−OPT1 andN
CHE
1 (R
N−OPT ,QN−OPT )),
and increases with N . Under a small worker population, few workers belonging to the same level
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due to the assumption of Poisson distribution in Section V, hence different workers make their
decisions sequentially as in Algorithm 2. This means that higher level workers will be able to
adjust their choices by responding to the lower-level workers’ choices. That is to say, if the
number of workers selecting task m exceeds NN−OPTm , higher level workers will no longer select
the same task. As a result, given the same rewards in the FR and BR models, the NN−OPTm and
NCHEm (R
N−OPT ,QN−OPT ) in Stage II will be similar.
As N becomes large enough (i.e., N ≥ 55), Fig. 5 shows that the NN−OPTm in the FR
model no longer changes (as the task has attracted enough workers when the marginal revenue
equals the cost). Meanwhile, NCHEm (R
N−OPT ,QN−OPT ) in the BR model continues to increase
and the value is larger than NN−OPTm . The reason is that before a particular worker selects
the task m, the number of workers selecting the same task may be close but still less than
NN−OPTm , and that worker believes he will gain a positive payoff if he is the only new worker
to select this task. However, there can be multiple workers at the same level going through
the same reasoning process, and multiple workers may end up selecting the same task. As a
result, NCHEm (R
N−OPT ,QN−OPT ) will exceed NN−OPTm . When N increases, every cognitive
level contains more workers, so the difference between NCHEm (R
N−OPT ,QN−OPT ) and NN−OPTm
becomes larger.
Observation 3: Given the same task settings (R and Q), the number of workers selecting tasks
in the BR model increases unboundedly with the total number of workers, while it will saturate
in the FR model.
2) The requester can set different profit maximizing rewards and quality requirements: Next we
consider a second scenario where the requester can freely choose her profit maximizing rewards
and requirements in Stage I to maximize her payoff, which leads to the corresponding NE and
CHE. Fig. 6 illustrates the maximum total profits in both the FR and BR models.
When N is small (i.e., N ≤ 20), the maximum profits in both models are the same and increase
with N . The explanation is similar to that in Fig. 5 for the small N case.
As N becomes large (i.e., N ≥ 25), Fig. 6 shows that the profit in the FR model will not
further increase because the near-optimal reward RN−OPT , quality requirement QN−OPT and
the NE NN−OPT do not further increase in N. However, the profit in the BR model goes up
unboundedly with the total number N . This is because as N increases, there are more level-0
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workers, hence eventually the requester can simply set Rm = cm and relies on the increasing
number of level-0 workers to accomplish these tasks.
Observation 4: The profit in the BR model increases unboundedly with the number of workers,
while it saturates in the FR model.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented the first study regarding how the bounded cognitive rationality
(i.e., the cognitive limits of reasoning) affects the incentive mechanism design in multimedia
crowdsourcing systems. In the fully rational benchmark case, we derived the requester’s optimal
rewards and quality requirements, as well as the workers’ Nash equilibrium selections. Due to
the high computational complexity in the heterogeneous workers’ case, we proposed a low-
complexity heuristic algorithm to compute the near-optimal solution. In the bounded rational
case, we modeled the workers’ belief formation and progressive decision process based on the
cognitive hierarchy theory in behavioral economics. We analyzed how the requester can improve
her profit by taking advantage of the workers’ imperfect reasoning. Simulation results showed
that the requester is more likely to obtain a higher profit under a larger worker population with
a lower average cognitive level.
For the future work, we will consider the impact of bounded cognitive rationality in more
practical system scenarios. For example, it is interesting to consider rewards that depend on both
the workers’ sensing efforts and quality capabilities, and worker costs that are both task and
worker dependent. Also, we will conduct field trials to validate our theory, e.g., estimating the
value of average cognitive level τ for different types of crowdsourcing applications.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
We need to prove that constraints (7a)-(7f) are sufficient and necessary conditions in two
directions.
I) We first prove the “if” part:
a) First, we discuss the task selections of workers with high quality capabilities. We define
a task set M1 = {m ∈ M : NNEH,m > 0} containing tasks which are selected by high
quality workers. Then we define M2 = {m ∈ M : NNEH,m = 0} = M\M1 containing
tasks which are not selected by any high quality workers.
For a high quality capability worker, if he selects a task m ∈M1, from constraint (7a)
he will gain a payoff of Rm
NNE
H,m
+NNE
L,m
− cm = λ1 ≥ 0.
If he changes to select a task m ∈ M2, from constraint (7a) he will gain a payoff of
Rm
NNE
H,m
+NNE
L,m
− cm ≤ λ1.
If not all the high quality workers participate (i.e.,
∑
m∈MN
NE
H,m < NH), then we have
λ1 = 0 from constraint (7b), and a high quality capability worker has no incentive to
select a task.
Hence, given constraints constraints (7a)-(7f), a worker with high quality capability has
no incentive to change his task selection strategy.
b) Then, we discuss the task selections of workers with low quality capabilities.
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For a low quality capability worker, he has no incentive to select a task m ∈ MH ,
because he will always receive a payoff of −cm < 0.
The analysis for constraints (7d) and (7e) are similar to (7a) and (7b).
Hence, given constraints constraints (7c)-(7e), a worker with low quality capability has
no incentive to change his task selection strategy.
Overall, if constraints (7a)-(7f) are all satisfied, (NNEH ,N
NE
L ) is an NE.
II) We then proof the “only if” part:
If (NNEH ,N
NE
L ) is an NE, no workers would like to deviate from the current state.
a) For a high quality worker, if he selects task m ∈ M1 and has no incentive to change
his strategy, because the payoff of selecting task m is no lower than that of choosing
other strategies. Hence, we have λ1 =
Rm
NNE
H,m
+NNE
L,m
− cm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈M1. Then we have
constraint (7a) because NNEH,m ≥ 0. If not all high quality capabilities workers participate,
then we have constraint (7b) so that they will not change their strategies. If all the high
quality capabilities workers participate, then constraint (7b) is always satisfied.
b) For a low quality capability worker, he has no incentive to select a task m ∈ MH ,
hence we have constraint (7c).
The analysis for constraints (7d) and (7e) are similar to (7a) and (7b). Constraint (7f)
is the model setting of the paper.
Overall, under the NE (NNEH ,N
NE
L ), constraints (7a)-(7f) are all satisfied.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
We need to prove that (9a)-(9c) are necessary conditions for Problem (Profit-Bilevel). In other
words, if (9a)-(9c) are not satisfied, constraints in Problem (Profit-Bilevel) will be violated, or
the optimal value will not be achieved.
Firstly, given the rewards R and the task sets MH and ML, the number of workers selecting
tasks under the NE NNEH and N
NE
L are determined. Then we have constraint (9a) to determine
the optimal quality requirements to maximize the requester’s profit.
Given constraint (9b), we have λ1 = λ2 = 0 in constraints (7a)-(7f). And we will focus on
proving λ1 = 0 case, because the proof for λ2 = 0 is similar. There are two cases that we need
to consider: λ1 < 0 and λ1 > 0.
• If λ1 < 0, then constraint (7f) is violated.
• If λ1 > 0, we can always find a λˆ1 > 0 satisfying λ1 > λˆ1 ≥ 0, and we have
Rˆm =
(
cm + λˆ1
) (
NNEL,m +N
NE
H,m
)
< Rm = (cm + λ1)
(
NNEL,m +N
NE
H,m
)
, ∀m ∈M.
35
Then we have
Um(Qm(N
NE
L,m +N
NE
H,m))− Rˆm > Um(Qm(NNEL,m +NNEH,m))−Rm, ∀m ∈M.
which implies that λ1 > 0 is not the optimal solution to the problem.
Thus, constraint (9b) is also necessary for Problem (Profit-Bilevel). And we have constraint
(9c) because both the number of high quality capabilities workers and the total number of workers
are non-negative and limited.
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Firstly, we prove that under the case when workers are with homogeneous quality capabilities,
if the workers all participate in the FR model, they will all participate in the BR model. Then
we prove that the CHE converges to the NE as τ →∞.
Given the rewards R and the quality requirements Q, we have
∑
m∈MN
NE
m (R,Q) = N ,
where all the N workers are with homogeneous quality capabilities. From Proposition 1, for a
task m ∈ M with Rm > 0, there will be Nm = Rmcm+λ workers selecting task m, where λ ≥ 0
is every worker’s payoff. And because of the positive rewards, in the BR model, all the level-0
workers will participate.
Then we prove that for a level-k (k ≥ 1) worker, if he believes that all lower level workers
participate, he will also select a task and participate.
For a level-k worker, there are N˜m(k) workers selecting taskm in his belief and
∑
m∈M N˜m(k) =
N . Then there must be at least a task m ∈M such that Rm
N˜m(k)
−cm ≥ λ ≥ 0 and this worker will
select task m. If not, then we have N˜m(k) >
Rm
cm+λ
, ∀m ∈M, which leads to a contradiction that∑
m∈M N˜m(k) >
∑
m∈M
Rm
cm+λ
= N . Hence, all the level-k workers are willing to select a task
and participate in the BR case. And this completes the proof that all the workers will participate
in the BR model.
Then we define nm(k) = Nf(k)e(k,m) as the number of level-k workers joining task m, and
Nm(k) =
∑k
j=0 nm(j) as the total number of workers from level-0 to level-k selecting task m.
Thus, we have NCHEm (R,Q) = Nm(∞) and nm(k) = Nm(k)−Nm(k − 1), k ≥ 1.
If Nm(k) reaches or exceeds N
NE
m (R,Q), then workers with higher level than k will never
select task m. Because for level-(k + i) (i ≥ 1) workers, we have
Nm(k + i− 1)∑k+i−1
j=0 f(j)
≥ Nm(k)∑k+i−1
j=0 f(j)
> Nm(k) ≥ NNEm (R,Q),
E(k + i,m) =
Rm
Nk+i−1∑k+i−1
j=0 f(j)
− cm < Rm
NNEm (R,Q)
− cm < λ.
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In other words, all the workers with levels higher than k will not select task m, because there
exists at least one task with payoff higher than λ and we have NCHEm (R,Q) = Nm(k).
Before proving the convergence property, we need to have the following lemmas for preparation.
Lemma 1: In the BR model, level-⌊τ⌋ accounts for the most fraction with τ⌊τ⌋⌊τ⌋! e−τ .
Proof: Since f(k) = τ
k
k!
e−τ , we can have f(k)
f(k−1) =
τ
k
, in other words, for k ≤ ⌊τ⌋, we always
have
f(k)
f(k−1) =
τ
k
≥ 1; for k ≥ ⌊τ + 1⌋, we always have f(k)
f(k−1) =
τ
k
< 1. Thus, if τ is an integer,
level τ and (τ − 1) account for the most fraction, with f(τ) = f(τ − 1) = ττ
τ !
e−τ ; if τ is not an
integer, level-⌊τ⌋ accounts for the most fraction with τ⌊τ⌋
⌊τ⌋!
e−τ .
Lemma 2: limτ→∞
τ⌊τ⌋
⌊τ⌋! e
−τ = 0.
Proof: Define non-negative integer n = ⌊τ⌋ and sequence {xn = nnn! e−n}. Then we have
xn+1
xn
=
e−(n+1) · (n+ 1)(n+1) · n!
e−n · nn · (n+ 1)!
=
1
e
· (n+ 1
n
)n.
Since xn > 0 and (1+
1
n
)n < e, we have xn+1
xn
< 1. Hence, the sequence {xn} is monotonically
decreasing with a lower bound 0. Thus, the sequence has a limit. For large n value, we use
Stirling’s approximation (i.e., n! ∼ √2πn(n
e
)n) and
lim
n→∞
xn = lim
n→∞
nn
n!
e−n
= lim
n→∞
nn√
2πn(n
e
)n
e−n
= 0.
Since n = ⌊τ⌋, we have limτ→∞ τ⌊τ⌋⌊τ⌋! e−τ = limτ→∞ ⌊τ⌋
⌊τ⌋
⌊τ⌋! e
−⌊τ⌋ = limn→∞ xn = 0.
From Lemma 1, we have NCHEm (R,Q)−NNEm (R,Q) < nm(k) ≤ τ
⌊τ⌋
⌊τ⌋! e
−τN .
Then we calculate NCHEm (R,Q) − NNEm (R,Q), and suppose for task m ∈ M1, we have
NCHEm (R,Q)−NNEm (R,Q) > 0, and NCHEm (R,Q)−NNEm (R,Q) < 0 for task m ∈M2. Note
that
|M1|+ |M2| ≤M,∑
m∈M1
|NCHEm (R,Q)−NNEm (R,Q)| =
∑
m∈M2
|NCHEm (R,Q)−NNEm (R,Q)|.
Thus, we have
max
m∈M2
|NCHEm (R,Q)−NNEm (R,Q)| ≤
∑
m∈M1
|NCHEm (R,Q)−NNEm (R,Q)| ≤
τ ⌊τ⌋
⌊τ⌋!e
−τM1N,
and from Lemma 2, we have
lim
τ→∞
|NCHEm (R,Q)−NNEm (R,Q)| = 0, ∀m ∈M.
In other words, the CHE converges to NE as τ approaches ∞.
37
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Average Cognitive Level  τ
D
iff
er
en
ce
 o
f N
um
be
rs
 A
ttr
ac
te
d
 
 
|N1
CHE(R, Q) − N1
NE(R, Q)|
|N2
CHE(R, Q) − N2
NE(R, Q)|
|N3
CHE(R, Q) − N3
NE(R, Q)|
|N4
CHE(R, Q) − N4
NE(R, Q)|
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D. Proof of Theorem 2
There are two cases of heterogeneous workers selecting tasks:
• All the high quality capability workers focus on high quality requirement tasks in the FR
model.
• The high quality capability workers also focus on low quality requirement tasks in the FR
model.
In the first case, given the same rewards and quality requirements in the BR model, level-0
high quality capability workers will always participate and randomly select the tasks (including
low quality requirement tasks). If they all focus on the high quality requirement tasks, all these
workers will get a payoff of λ1 from Proposition 1. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, for a
level-k worker, there must be at least one task m ∈ M1 with payoff Rm
N˜m(k)
− cm ≥ λ1 ≥ 0. If
not, we have
∑
m∈M1
N˜m(k) > NH which is a contradiction. Hence all the high quality workers
will participate.
In the second case, from Proposition 1, we have λ1 = λ2 ≥ 0. And a worker (regardless of the
quality capability) will receive a payoff of λ = λ1 = λ2 as he selects task m ∈ M. Similarly,
for a level-k worker with high quality capability, there must be at least one task m ∈ M with
payoff Rm
N˜m(k)
− cm ≥ λ ≥ 0. If not, we have
∑
m∈M N˜m(k) > N which is a contradiction. Hence
all the high quality workers will participate.
For low level quality capability workers, they can only select low requirement tasks, and there
is no guarantee they will always participate in the BR case.
38
TABLE II
N = 50, NH = 15: max{|N
CHE
m (R,Q)−N
NE
m (R,Q)|}
Rewards & Quality
requirements
τ Value
5 10 20 40 80
R = (5, 20, 15, 10), Q = (qH , 1, 1, 1) 3.8772 2.2020 1.0131 0.2396 0.0495
R = (12, 18, 15, 8), Q = (qH , 1, 1, qH) 3.0778 2.0937 1.6583 1.0584 0.6854
R = (20, 14, 17, 6), Q = (1, 1, qH , 1) 4.1226 2.7792 1.0168 0.6666 0.3158
TABLE III
N = 200, NH = 40: max{|N
CHE
m (R,Q)−N
NE
m (R,Q)|}
Rewards & Quality
requirements
τ Value
5 10 20 40 80
R = (50, 30, 15, 20), Q = (qH , 1, 1, 1) 18.5015 8.09448 5.8064 2.2304 0.9737
R = (42, 25, 15, 18), Q = (qH , qH , 1, 1) 25.6999 10.5333 6.7059 4.9442 2.8783
R = (26, 16, 32, 18), Q = (qH , 1, 1, qH) 15.0662 11.5333 3.5229 1.5609 1.0524
E. Numerical Results on Convergence for
∑
m∈MN
NE
m (R,Q) < N Case and Heterogeneous
Case
The convergence properties can be shown by the difference of |NCHEm (R,Q)−NNEm (R,Q)|
when setting the same rewards R and quality requirements Q in the FR and BR models, and Fig.
7 is a simple example when setting c = (1, 2, 1.5, 2), R = (15, 20, 20, 30), Q = (1, qH , qH , 1),
N = 100, and NH = 30.
For different system parameters, we fix costs as c = (1, 2, 1.5, 2), change the rewards R,
quality requirements Q, the number of high quality capability workers NH and the total number
N , and compare the difference between CHE and NE (i.e., max
m∈M
{|NCHEm (R,Q)−NNEm (R,Q)|})
under different τ values. Table II and III list some of the results, and the difference between CHE
and NE decreases with τ .
